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The Coast Guard is evaluating the potential of Lighter-
Than-Air (LTA) vehicles for possible future Coast Guard
utilization. Progress of the project is explored. Safety
science is an emerging field particularly of value in the
historically hazardous realm of aviation. The System Safety
Concept as applicable to major project development is
examined. One of the fundamental tasks of system safety
management is to identify possible hazards early in the
conceptual phase of product development. If the concept is
not without historical precedence, part of this task is
accomplished by examining historical safety records to
identify potential hazards. To this end, records of Navy
LTA mishaps are examined and comparisons are made to Coast
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I. INTRODUCTION
For over 30 years, up until 1961 , the U.S. Navy
maintained a fleet of 'Lighter Than Air' (LTA) craft known
also as dirigibles, blimps, or simply airships. These craft
combined, in a unique fashion, many advantages of both
maritime patrol airplanes and ocean going ships. Like the
airplane, the LTA can cover large surface areas from the
vantage of high altitude and at relatively high speed;
additionally it can hover like a helicopter. Its ship-like
qualities include the ability to track other ships as well
as interdict and even board when necessary. The LTA also
possesses the long endurance capability of a ship. Despite
these attractive features, the Navy gradually shifted focus
away from LTA operations ceasing their use altogether by
1962 with the retirement of the last airships in the fleet.
The postwar emergence of high performance aircraft, the
rising cost of helium and what was then considered high
costs due to the personnel requirements for handling
airships were all contributing factors in ushering out the
era of Naval airships.
As this era was drawing to a close the curtain was
rising on a new field of scientific study; safety science in
the 1950's was just emerging. The same technical advances
in aviation, which hastened the demise of the airship,

provided unprecedented challenges to those who would build
and operate the increasingly complex high performance
aircraft being produced. The new sophisticated systems were
not only more expensive but much more demanding of the human
elements involved. This situation posed increased risks ,
the minimization of which became the objective of a new
prof es sion -- the safety analyst. The establishment of the
Naval Aviation Safety Center (NASC) in 1955 followed by the
establishment of safety programs in the various military
services, marked the arrival of safety science as a separate
and vital field of endeavor. A central concept in the new
field is that of 'system safety 1 :
The system safety concept is the application of special
technical and managerial skills to the systematic,
forward-looking identification and control of hazards
throughout the life cycle of a project, program, or
activity. The concept calls for safety analyses and
hazard control actions, beginning with the conceptual
phase of a system and continuing through the design,
i
Risk, associated with likelihood or possibility of harm,
the expected value of loss. [Ref. 1: p. 8]
^Hazards: The Safety person sees a hazard as an implied
threat of danger, of possible harm. It is a potential
condition waiting to become a loss. A stimulus is required
to cause the hazard to transfer from the potential state to
the loss. This stimulus could be component failure, a
condition of the system (pressure, temperature, switching
condition that is out of tolerance, a maintenance failure,
an operator, or a combination of other events and
conditions. More technically--a potential condition, or set
of conditions, either internal and/or external to a system,
product, facility, or operation, which, when activated by a
stimulus, transforms the hazard into a real condition, or
series of events which culminate in a loss (an accident).
[Ref. 1 : p. 6 ]

production, testing, use, and disposal phases, until the
activity is re tired. ..involves a planned, disciplined,
systematically organized, and b efore-the-fact process
characterized as the 'ident if y-anal yz e-cont rol method of
safety. The emphasis is placed upon an acceptable safety
level designed into the system prior to actual production
or operation of the system. The system safety discipline
requires timely identification and evaluation of system
ha zards- -before losses occur. These hazards must be
eliminated or controlled to an acceptable level to provide
a system that can be developed, tested, operated, and
maintained safely. Proper application of the system
safety concept requires a disciplined use of technical
methods, including management controls necessary to assure
its timely and economical completion [Ref. 1: p. 9].
Today the impact of the safety field is very wide reaching.
Perhaps the most evident contributions have been made in
U.S. Air Force and NASA applications:
The basic missile systems developed in the late 1950s and
early 1960s demanded a new approach to examining the
hazards associated with the weapons systems. The
Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was
one of the first systems to have a formal, disciplined,
system safety program associated with it. Much of the
success of the NASA programs can be attributed to the
effort that system safety played in the hazard
identification, evaluation and control [Ref. 1: p. 11].
Systems developed prior to the advent of the system safety
concept which have endured through today, or systems brought
out of retirement pose problems for the safety analyst: in
the past, safety programs were usually established
piecemeal, based on a fter-the-fac t philosophy of accident
prevention. For example, an aviation approach is often
called the "fly-fix- fly" approach: build it and fly it; if
it doesn't work, fix it and try flying again. Safety is
usually considered informally by those connected with an
activity. When an accident occurs, an investigation is
10

conducted to determine the cause. Accident causes are then
reviewed and discussed to determine what must be done to
prevent similar accidents. The resulting system
modifications, retrofits, or correction of design safeguards
or procedures are made to existing systems. However,
corrections can be wasteful and costly and are usually
vigorously resisted because of previously committed
investments [Ref. 1: p. 9].
An event in the 1970s stimulated renewed interest in
just such an abandoned system. The enactment of legislation
in 1977 establishing a 200 mile zone of U.S. jurisdiction
off the shores of the United States vastly expanded the
responsibilities of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard,
tasked with enforcing Federal laws within the vast new
areas, faced several challenges in exercising their policing
authority. As a policing authority the tasks facing the
Coast Guard can be summarized as follows:
1. The protection of resources, notably fishing stocks.
This requires vessels to be identified, their fishing
tackle to be examined and their catch quotas to be
verified. 'Friendly' craft need to be positively
identified and intruders warned off, or apprehended.
2. The detection and reporting of any illegal transit of
the ocean space (e.g., illegal immigration,
smuggling )
.
3. The monitoring of surface vessel traffic, particularly
hazardous cargoes, enduring safe passage of oil and




4. The monitoring of all forms of environmental pollution
and the early discovery of oil spills, sea-bed well
faults and associated problems.
5. The reporting of wrecks or hazards to navigation, and
the inspection of emplaced buoys. [Ref. 2]
At present these activities are performed by ships and
aircraft of the Coast Guard. The many advantages of the
LTA, mentioned earlier, made consideration of the LTA a
viable option in the minds of planners tasked with
developing a program for carrying out the Coast Guard's new
responsibilities. the acquisition and operational costs
promised to e significantly lower than for any other
maritime patrol aircraft or surface vessel, with lower
manpower requirements than most otherwise employed surface
vessels. Interest sine the late 1970s led to a project to
evaluate the LTA option. The project is currently in a test
and evaluation phase with a demonstrator LTA and the project
is targeted for completion by FY 1989.
The following chapters explore the specifics of the
Coast Guard's LTA project, the elements of system safety,




II. BACKGROUND: THE MPA AND THE COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard is a military organization. In contrast
to the other U.S. military organizations, which are
administratively attached to the Department of Defense, the
Coast Guard is administratively attached to the Department
of Transportation. During times of declared war, the Coast
Guard falls under control of the Department of the Navy.
The reason for this difference is that the Coast Guard is
the only military service with Federal Law enforcement
responsibilities. These responsibilities, while somewhat
related to national security, are basically non-military in
nature, hence the peace-time separation in administrative
control. These responsibilities are formulated in several
main objectives and are reflected in the operating programs
of the Coast Guard.
A. COAST GUARD PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROGRAMS
Objective A - to minimize loss of life, personal
injury, and property damage on, over and under the
high seas and waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Objective B - to facilitate transportation with
particular emphasis on waterborne activity in support
of national economic, defense and social needs.
Objective C - to maintain an effective, ready armed
force prepared for and immediately responsive to
specific tasks in time of war or emergency.
13

Objective D - to assure the safety and security of
vessels and of ports and waterways and their related
shoreside facilities.
Objective E - to enforce federal laws and
international agreements on and under waters subject
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and under the high
seas where authorized.
Objective G - to cooperate with other governmental
agencies and entities (federal, state and local) to
assure efficient utilization of public resources, and
to carry out activities in the international sphere
where appropriate in furthering national policy.
[Ref . 3: pp. 9-10]
These responsibilities have been embodied in the
operating programs of the Coast Guard, for planning,
budgeting and controlling purposes.
1 . Short-Rang e Aids to N avigatio n and Radionavigatio n
Aids (ATON)
Facilitation of safe and expeditious passage of marine
traffic is the purpose of a system of over 47,000
buoys, lights, radio beacons and daymarks, and
numerous Loran and Omega stations which provide far-
reaching continuous electronic navigation for ships
and aircraft.
2. Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT)
Protection and preservation of natural resources and
national interests in U. S. territorial and adjacent
waters is one of the oldest functions but is
particularly significant since the country established
a 200-mile economic management zone for its coastal
waters. The program encompasses surveillance of
foreign fishing fleets, suppression of smuggling and




Military Preparedness and Military Operations ( MP /MO)
By law the Coast Guard must maintain itself as a
ready, effective armed force, prepared for specific
tasks in time of war or national emergency. Coast
Guard units operate with the Navy to train and support
some naval operations. The service is transferred to
14





Commercial Vessel Safety (CVS)
In order to prevent injury and death, property loss,
and environmental damage, the Coast Guard administers
regulations governing commercial vessels and oil rigs.
Safety standards are implemented through vessel and
equipment inspection, vessel documentation, licensing
of seamen and investigation of accidents and
violations
.
5. Search and Rescue (SAR)
Perhaps the most glamorous of the operating programs,
the assistance of persons and property in distress
extends to U.S. jurisdictional waters, the Caribbean
Sea, and most of the North Pacific and North Atlantic
Oceans. An estimated 4300 lives and $268 million in
property were saved in 1973.
6 Recreational Boating Safety (RBS)
This program seeks to minimize the loss of life and
property associated with recreational boating. Safety
patrols are conducted, liaison with state and local
agencies is maintained, equipment is approved for
manufacture, and educational programs for the boater
are promoted. The Coast Guard Auxiliary, a volunteer
organization sponsored by the Coast Guard, provides
valuable assistance in this functional area.
7
.
Domestic and Polar Icebreaking ( PI , PO)
8. Port Safety and Security ( PSS)
To reduce the risk of marine accidents, the Coast
Guard monitors activity in ports and harbors and
enforces a variety of laws and safety regulations.
This involves supervision of vessels loading, carrying
and discharging hazardous cargoes, investigation of
accidents and violations, and managing traffic flows.
The establishment of vessel traffic systems is the
newest development.
9 . Marine Science Activities (MSA)
Oceanographic and meteorological activities are
conducted to support national marine science
objectives and other Coast Guard programs. This
15

includes data collection, conducting the International




Marine Environmental Protection ( MEP
)
In order to prevent and minimize damage to the marine
environment, the Coast Guard enforces laws and
regulations in this area, maintains surveillance of
coastal waters, administers a system of enforcement
and maintains a cleanup capability. Pollution by
petroleum products is especially significant and a
continuing concern of the program.
1 1
.
Bridge Administration ( BA)
Bridges crossing waterways are frequently impediments
to the passage of marine traffic. The Coast Guard
inspects bridges, issues permits to insure that marine
needs are met, promulgates regulations for
drawbridges, and supervises modifications to bridges
creating undue obstructions.
1 2 Support Programs
Support of the operating programs is provided by
communications, public affairs, research and
development, personnel, civil rights, legal,
engineering, fiscal and supply, health care, and
intelligence/security programs. [Ref. 3: pp. 13-15]
Clearly the Coast Guard is essentially concerned with
maritime matters. Under its jurisdiction are all the
navigable waters of the U.S. as well as coastal areas today
extending 200 miles off our shores. The primary resources
of the Coast Guard for accomplishing its manifold missions
are ships, boats, aircraft and the people who manage,
maintain and operate them.
Today the Coast Guard operates with an annual budget of
over 2.521 Billion dollars. There are 39,436 uniformed
personnel in the active Coast Guard and an additional 12,000
16

in the Reserve; the number of civilian employees is 5,382
and the Coast Guard maintains a force of 45,000 trained
volunteers in the 'Coast Guard Auxiliary 1 . The service
operates 2000 boats and ships of various descriptions, as
well as some 159 aircraft both fixed wing and helicopter.
[Ref: 4]
In a continuing effort to maximize the utility of its
limited resources for accomplishing its missions, the Coast
Guard maintains a research and development office. (See
Figure 1) [Ref. 3: p. 16]
B. MARINE PATROL AIRSHIP PROJECT
In 1977 the Coast Guard was faced with a difficult
situation. Vastly increased areas of responsibility coupled
with an essentially static budget stimulated planners'
interest in searching for economical alternatives for
carrying out Coast Guard missions. About this time, FY
1976, the U.S. Navy was conducting studies in the area of
LTA vehicles. The Advanced Naval Y®hAc:_le_s_ Concept
Evaluation (ANVCE) study, conducted by the Goodyear
Aerospace Corporation, focused on generating analytical
tools in terms of aerodynamic characteristics, stern
propulsion characteristics and a VTOL (vertical take off and
landing) flight dynamics computer simulation. The
conclusions of the study were favorable for the Navy's
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a U.S. Navy 1950's design of a ZPG-2W (See Figure 2) [Ref.
5] was produced. Operational characteristics for VTOL,
resupply at sea and towed array ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare)
were evaluated as good. [Ref. 6: pp. 1-2]
The following year, FY 1977, the Coast Guard financed a
study by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). This study,
CNA 1078 (May 1978), examined LTA vehicles in performing the
USCG missions of Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT),
Marine Environmental Protection (MEP), and Search and Rescue
(SAR) with emphasis placed on the reconnaissance tasks
involved in these missions. The results of this analysis
were compared to similar data on Coast Guard operational
hydrofoils used for fisheries law enforcement. Essentially
the study analyzed the cos t /per form ance of various
conceptual airships. The analysis included an examination
of the sensitivity of cost factors to certain
characteristics (utilization rates, investment, personnel,
maintenance, and fuel costs). The conclusions of this study
were that based on miles of trail tasks and square miles
surveiled, LTA vehicles were more costly than alternative
vehicles. However, the Coast Guard took exception to these
findings and continued exploration of the LTA alternative.
[Ref. 6: pp. 1-2] A 1980 study by the Naval Air Development
Center entitled Marine P atro l Airshi p S tudy ( MPAS , March
1980) was commissioned for the Coast Guard to determine
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requirements including a cost assessment of a Coast Guard
airship system. This study concluded that airships would be
of direct benefit to the Coast Guard in mission
accomplishment and that the airship could be cost
competitive with other Coast Guard vehicles, e.g., aircraft
and surface vessels. [Ref. 6: pp. 1-2]
The next step taken by the Coast Guard in pursuing its
study of the LTA concept was as a minority partner in a
multiagency technical evaluation of modern airships in 1979.
The U.S. Forestry Service (USFS) Helistat Project sought to
design and construct a 'heavy-lift' logging vehicle
assembled from old (1950's vintage) GFE helicopters and a
one million cubic foot airship envelope. The vehicle was
being assembled to demonstrate logging operations in the
Pacific Northwest. Due to the highly specialized nature of
this specific design--heavy lift for logging operations--no
promising conclusions regarding possible Coast Guard
utilization of this particular airship were drawn.
At the present time the Coast Guard is conducting a four
year, multimil lion dollar program to flight validate the
patrol airship concept in USCG operations. A competitive
procurement is underway to design, but not build, a full-
scale vehicle and to design, fabricate and test a reduced
scale airship demonstration vehicle. The effort includes a
comprehensive development of life-cycle costs and estimates
of the survivability of this vehicle in Coast Guard
21

operational weather conditions. To date a demonstration
vehicle has been man-rated and has flown tests under Coast
Guard mission scenarios. Table II-1 [Ref. 7] summarizes the
activities included in the tests of the patrol airship
demonstrator (PAD). The results of these tests are not yet
available; the tests are in progress at this time but should
be completed in FY 1984 [Ref. 6: p. 2] The project is
titled: Lighter -Than -Air System Concept Definition.
The project narrative outlines the Coast Guard's
continuing interest in the LTA concept:
"Historically, the LTA type vehicle or airship has
demonstrated one of the highest fuel efficiencies for
aircraft. Because of this, the LTA concept has been
identified as an approach warranting further examination.
The application of modern technological approaches to
the LTA concept has also created new interest in these
vehicles as cost-effective, energy-efficient multimission
platforms. Advances in materials, control systems,
avionics, and propulsion developed for modern helicopter
and aircraft systems can now be applied to the LTA concept
to provide a reliable and efficient vehicle.
In addition, many possible capabilities available from
this concept are uniquely available in one vehicle and
lend themselves ideally to the Coast Guard multimission
approach. The ability to launch and recover a small boat
for boarding operations, tow small craft or sonar arrays,
and carry large payloads such as required in the MEP
mission, are coupled with a 90 knot dash speed, 60 knot
cruise speed, and long loiter and endurance capability.
Due to this uniqueness, the LTA vehicle cannot be directly
compared to either ship or aircraft platforms; however, an
LTA vehicle would be highly useful in complementing
existing and future ship and aircraft resources.
The Coast Guard has indicated an interest in the LTA
concept since the mid 1970's. Between 1975 and 1980,
several conceptual studies of limited depth were performed
and, in general, it appeared that an LTA system was at
22

Table II-1 . LTA Test Plan, Mission Demo
Patrol /Transit /Search
Goal- discover & qualify the advantages of airship over
F/W & R/W & Ships.
Expected advantages
1 . discrete mission comparison
Fuel Consumption
Man hours committed
Probability of Detection (POD) achieved
CREW fatigue (Subjective)
Execution
a. Plan and execute a maximum endurance Radar/Visual or
search pattern for small surface vessel @ 8 hrs.
Data: Fuel log
WX, search conditions










Data Reduction: Fuel consumption
POD
POD-SQMl/hr.
Crew fraction for A/S ops
Crew fraction for search
Crew mission hrs/POD semi
Compare to Vessel & C130
b. Plan and execute a max endurance visual search
pattern for raft, debris, PIW @ 8 hrs.
Data: Same as above DR: Same as above
+ compare to Helo performance H-3
& H-65
c. Night search for small surface vessel, raft with
IR/UV devices.
Data: Same as above
+ Sensor contacts,
effectiveness





Goal- to evaluate LTA vehicles ability to maintain trail
on a vessel for extended periods of time.
Expected advantages: Low fuel consumption, less crew
stress during trail, low crew workload during
trail, overnight escort of distress vessel, low
vulnerability to small arms fire.
Execution:
a. Establish trail on several moving vessels
Data: Fuel Consumption rate
Vessel description, CSE/speed
WX & winds
Crew stress for far offshore scenario
Crew workload
Trail options (range/altitude)
b. Establish trail on several drifting vessels





best trail range/altitude options
3. HOVER/BOARD/ Equipment delivery (beyond helo range)
Goals
Equipment delivery to surface
Personnel delivery to surface
Personnel hoist from vessel
Boat launch at sea
Boat retrieval at sea
Expected advantages:
100% success delivery of equipment to vessel beyond helo
range. Hoist person from raft/ship beyond helo range.
Lower person to Ches. light cheaper than Helo (H-3, H-
65)
Execution
Practice hover over land ( heavy /neutral buoyancy)
Deliver equipment to spot on land




Practice hover over drifting boat
Deliver equipment to drifting boat (with/ without trail
line)
Retrieve equipment from drifting boat
Launch Boat in river





' least cost competitive, and possibly more economical than
other air and surface platforms which were considered.
Initial requirements (G-0 Memorandum, serial 3900,
dated June 4, 1980) identified by G-0 indicate that the
increase in the emphasis of the surveillance role in Coast
Guard missions and rising fuel costs make an extended
endurance air platform a desirable asset. The LTA vehicle
is a highly stable, quiet, and fuel efficient surveillance
platform. It is likely that in the long term, fuel cost
will increase more rapidly than the overall inflation rate
and it will become a larger fraction of direct operating
costs (DOC) and life-cycle cost (LCC). Therefore fuel
performance will become an increasingly important, primary
measure of merit in vehicle design. In this respect the
LTA concept is very attractive.
Initial requirements (G-W Memorandum, serial 1649/11,
dated April 17, 1980) identified by G-W also indicate the
need for an extended endurance air platform. In addition,
Coast Guard MEP mission requirements indicate the
desirability of an on-scene logistics supply and support
capability to deploy and retrieve a small boat, to deliver
payloads of up to 9 tons, and to tow operating oil
recovery devices. A hover capable LTA platform is capable
of accomplishing these tasks." [Ref. 7: p. 2]
There are some notable obstacles and risks associated
with this LTA project. One assumption made by planners is
25

that an airship will be available for purchase or lease that
will have the necessary capability to demonstrate a
significant capacity for patrol mission performance and will
make use of improved technology in structure, propulsion and
control. In a patrol ship demonstrator, these assets would
be necessary in order to project an accurate picture, for
evaluation, of the final MPA system.
Planners note that only one American firm and two
European firms are known to be operating airships at
present. Considering the limited financial resources
allocated to the project, unless private industry is willing
to invest resources, competition will be very limited.
Environmental limitations, especially limits imposed by
moderate to high gusting winds, which define the operating
envelope for the airship, are the prime technical concern.
Historical data indicates that U.S. Naval airships did
operate year round from bases as far south as Key West,
Florida to as far north as South Weymouth, Massachusetts,
sometimes under subfreezing temperatures and in winds
exceeding 50 knots. However, historical data also indicates
that gusting winds above 10-15 knots did adversely affect
some (especially landing and masting) operations. The
records indicate that a higher degree of near ground (or




System costs and cost benefit ratios for the airship
must also be obtained. This will involve not only the
costing of the airship but also will consider system size
and distribution, size requirements, maintenance
requirements, personnel and training and all other support
requirements for an airship system. [Ref. 8]
Appendix A explores in detail the design mission
scenarios to be studied during the patrol airship
demonstration phase of the project. [Ref. 9]
It is still too early in the evaluation process to
predict whether and to what extent the LTA concept may
figure in the Coast Guard's future. Should the conclusions
of this project be favorable for developing an LTA fleet for
Coast Guard operations, many other hurdles lay ahead. would
the LTA replace other aircraft in the inventory or merely be
a supplement? Will funds be available for acquisition? a
myriad of issues remain to be resolved. The acquisition of
such a major system should include careful consideration of
the safety issues attendant. The next chapter explores the
concept of system safety, certainly an important concept
with applications for the development of an LTA vehicle.
27

III. THE FIELD OF SYSTEM SAFETY
The system safety concept is the application of special
technical and managerial skills to the systematic, forward-
looking identification and control of hazards throughout the
life cycle of a project, program or activity. [Ref. 1: p. 9]
The emphasis is placed upon an acceptable safety level
designed into the system prior to actual production or
operation of the system. It requires timely identification
and evaluation of system ha zards- -before losses occur.
These hazards must be eliminated or controlled to a
tolerable level to provide a system that can be developed,
tested, operated, and maintained safely. Proper application
of the system safety concept requires a disciplined use of
technical methods, including management controls necessary
to assure its timely and economical completion. [Ref. 1: p.
9]
A. SYSTEM SAFETY DEVELOPMENT
As opposed to older traditional safety tasks, which are
qualitative in nature, system safety is more quantitative in
nature and is rooted in systems and operations research
technology. Its early military applications included, for
example, assuring that inadvertent nuclear explosions would
not occur and that space travelers would be safe in their
28

journeys. System safety is now used in a multiplicity of
domains from aviation to mass transportation, petroleum
production and distribution, nuclear power plant
construction, and chemical facility design. [Ref. 1 : p. 11]
The basic objective of a system safety program is the
elimination or control of hazards, which will reduce the
potential loss of a system, reduce the potential injury or
morbidity, and reduce the potential damage to the system or
related equipment to an acceptable level. [Ref. 1: p. 14]
The complexity and involved interrelationship of
elements within, and external to, a system require detailed
system safety studies. Potential hazards are detected and
the probability of occurrence is estimated. The phases
include normal operational modes, maintenance modes, failure
modes of the system, failures of adjacent equipment, and
errors created by human performance. On summary, the
principle goal of a system safety program is the creation of
a reasonably safe product. [Ref. 1: p. 14]
B. SYSTEM SAFETY TASKS












The tasks are performed, ideally, throughout the life cycle
of a product or system. The six common phases of a life
cycle are Concept (Conceptual research), Definition (Design
validation), Development (Full-scale development), Produc-
tion (Manufacture), Deployment (Operation-maintenance),
Disposition (Termination-retirement). There are four major
control points for system safety in the development of a
system; they are the end points of the phases of concept,
definition, development and production. Figure 3, [Ref. 1
:
p. 24], illustrates the specific control processes. The
value of the review process is critical to reducing the
number of defects and oversights that commonly enter the
operational phase. Costs incurred by not correcting defects
until the operational phase can be two to ten times the
costs resulting from changes in a proper review. [Ref. 1:
p. 25]
There are primary safety program tasks to be
accomplished during each phase of system development.
C. SYSTEM SAFETY PHASES
During the concept phase historical data and future
technical forecasts are used to provide a basis for the
proposed system. Critical issues related to the product are
examined, system safety concerns with types of hazard are
identified, and their impacts are evaluated. A preliminary
hazard analysis (PHA) is an analytical tool used during the
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Figure 3. System Safety Phases
concept phase to bring out the hazards that would be
involved with a specific concept. Risk analysis (RA) on a
gross level would also be performed to determine the
immediate needs for hazard control and development of safety
design criteria. Also during the concept phase, system
safety management requires the development of a system
safety program plan (SSPP), identifying the tasks to be
accomplished in the total safety program for the evolution
of the subject system. The effort to develop a SSPP at this
time is of major importance to assure that safety is
examined in a logical, sequential manner throughout the
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entire program. [Ref. 28: pp. 25-26] Three basic questions
should be answered at the close of the concept phase.
1. Have hazards associated with the design been
discovered and evaluated to establish hazard controls?
2. Have risk analyses been initiated to establish the
means of hazard control.?
3. Are initial safety design requirements established for
the concept so that the next phase of system
definition can be initiated? [Ref. 1: p. 27]
During the Definition phase the safety tasks are
verification of the preliminary design and engineering of
the product. The SSPP should identify the analyses that
should be conducted. An examination of the hazards of
several designs may be required. An updating of the PHA is
accomplished, along with initiation of the subsystem hazard
analysis ( SSHA) and later integration into the system hazard
analysis (SHA). Risk analysis is employed to evaluate the
different hazards identified and considered in the
preliminary stages. Examination of risk is the key to
selection of final design. One or more safety analysis
techniques may be needed to identify the following: safety
equipment, specification of safety design requirements,
initial development of safety test plans and requirements,
and prototype testing to verify the type of design selected.
Not all hazards will be known at this time, since the design
is not yet complete. [Ref. 1: p. 28]
The development phase allows system definition to
include environmental impact, integrated logistics support,
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producible engineering, and operational use studies.
Prototype analysis and testing results are used as inputs
for a comprehensive operating hazard analysis (OHA) to
examine human-machine hazards. Interfaces with other
engineering disciplines will have been exercised in this
phase, particularly reliability engineering with the review
of the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). Failure
modes that are hazardous should have been clearly identified
in the hazard analysis, and action should have been taken
for their control. The completion of the development phase
leads to a go/no-go decision on a specific design before
production begins. The ability to make the correct go/no-go
decision is based upon completion of hazard analysis, safety
testing results, and complying with safety design criteria.
[Ref . 1 : p. 28
]
Monitoring by the safety staff during the production
phase is most important. Inspection and testing of the
product for quality control is performed and requires the
interaction of the safety and quality control departments.
Attesting to the quality of safety devices requires the
presence of system safety personnel. Training is initiated
during this phase. Safety personnel must monitor the total
training program to assure that safety training is
occurring. Updating of the analyses performed during the
definition and development phases will occur during this
phase. An objective review of past hazard analyses to
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verify that corrective action for hazards has been
incorporated in the manner set forth in the documentation is
required. Any changes necessitated at this time will be
subject to review and verification during the final
acceptance review (FAR). Finally, the system safety
engineering report (SSER) is a compilation of the production
phase inputs that identifies and documents the hazards of
the final product or system. This report should disclose
the safe use of the product in the environment in which it
may be deployed. Basically, it represents the data obtained
from the analyses, testing, and design criteria evolution.
The SSER should provide definite conclusions about the
safety integrity of the product and the means by which
specific hazards identified have been controlled. [Ref. 1 :
P. 29]
The deployment phase follows system acquisition,
development, and production. At this time the system
becomes operational. During this phase training of users is
conducted and data are accumulated (from production
failures, field failures, and accidents and incidents that
have occurred). System safety management has to be
available to follow up on any problem that may arise during
this period, and a system safety person should participate
in the work of the investigation board so that
identification of hazardous conditions can be made as soon
as possible and corrective actions can be devised in
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coordination with designers and reviewed by responsible
safety personnel. If engineering or design changes after
deployment occur, it is necessary that the system safety
personnel have an opportunity to review changes that may be
submitted so that no new problem is introduced into the
system as a result of an engineering change. [Ref. 1: p. 30]
Finally, a sixth phase--termination--may be significant
because of certain elements of the design or the presence of
hazardous materials. The system safety person should be
available to check out the previously developed procedures
for the product termination and to verify that the method
employed is carefully monitored. Since the actual
termination occurs at the end of operation, monitoring can
often be performed on a sampling basis to verify the correct
use of the termination procedure where it involves a
hazardous situation or substance. [Ref. 1: p. 30]
D. SYSTEM SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION
Commitment by a company's top management is vital to
foster a worthwhile system safety program. In most
industrial organizations the basic responsibility for
conducting the system safety program is assigned to the
project management level. Project management is charged
directly with the responsibility for the development of a
product or system with the resources available to accomplish
this task. Management is then required to plan and
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implement a proper program to accomplish the goal of a
safety designed product. The Department of Defense has been
in the forefront of developing and successfully using these
system safety concepts. [Ref. 1: p. 31 ]
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEM SAFETY
Military safety requirements have been set forth in Army
Material Command Pamphlet 385-23, U.S. Navy Handbook NVA ORD
OD 44942, U. S. Air Force AFCS Design Handbook DH 1-6 as
well as U.S. Department of Defense MIL-STD-882A.
The DOD publication MIL-STD-8 82 A, entitled M ilitar y
Standard S_y_.s t.
.§ m S a f_ e_t y_ P r og__r a m Re^uirem ents , ( S S P R ) ,
establishes system safety program objectives and procedures
approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the
Department of Defense. The guidelines are not specifically
applicable to the non-DOD Coast Guard but are voluntarily
followed, by Coast Guard program managers involved in major
systems acquisitions. The stated principle objective of a
system safety program within the Department of Defense is to
ensure that safety, consistent with mission requirements, is
designed into systems, subsystems, equipment and facilities,
collectively referred to as systems. These standards
provide uniform requirements for developing and implementing
a system safety program of sufficient comprehensiveness to
identify the hazards of a system and to ensure that adequate
measures are taken to eliminate or control the hazards. All
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phases of the system life cycle are included, e.g., design,
research and development, test and evaluation, production,
operation and support, and a modification and disposal. All
major as well as non-major yet risk related programs are
required to employ system safety program planning. The
managing activity or the contractor has the responsibility
for developing the plan based on system safety program
requirements established by the managing activity. [Ref.
10: p. 1 ]
Table III-1 [Ref. 10: pp. 2-3], lists many of the terms
used in MIL-STD-882A or (SSPR). With minor exceptions, the
SSPR is based on the same principles of system safety
previously discussed. Stated objectives for system safety
programs require the program to define a systematic approach
to ensure that:
Safety consistent with mission requirements is
designed into the system in a timely, cost- effective
manner.
Hazards associated with each system are identified and
evaluated, and eliminated or controlled to an
acceptable level throughout the entire lifecycle of a
system.
Managing Activity, the DOD organizational element of
DOD that will plan, organize, direct, contract, and control
tasks and associated functions appropriate to the life cycle
phase of the system. [Ref. 10: p. 2]
4 Contractor, a private sector enterprise or the
organizational element of DOD engaged to provide services or
products within agreed limits specified by the managing
activity. [Ref. 10: p. 2]
37

Table III-1 . System Safety Definitions
Mishap . An unplanned event or series of events that result
in death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss
of equipment or property.
Ri sk . An expression of possible loss in terms of hazard
severity and hazard probability.
Hazard . An existing or potential condition that can result
in a mishap (e.g., the presence of fuel in an undesired
location is a hazard whereas the fuel itself in not).
H a z_a r d p_r_o b a b ij^ i_ t^y_ . The likelihood, expressed in
quantitative or qualitative terms, that a hazard will occur.
Ha zard s everit y. A qualitative assessment of the worst
potential consequence, defined by the degree of injury,
occupational illness, property damage, or equipment damage
that could ultimately occur.
Safety . Freedom from those conditions that can cause death,
injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of
equipment or property.
Sy_s__tem. A composite, at any level of complexity, of
personnel, materials, tools, equipment, facilities, and
software. The elements of this composite entity are used
together in the intended operational or support environment
to perform a given task or achieve a specific production,
support, or mission requirement.
Subsyste m. An element of a system that, in itself, may
constitute a system.
Syst em s afet y. The optimum degree of safety within the
constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost
attained through specific application of system safety
management and engineering principles whereby hazards are
identified and risk minimized throughout all phases of the
system life cycle.
System safety engineering . An element of system engineering
requiring specialized professional knowledge and skills in
applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria,




Table III-1 . Cont'd
System safety group . A formally chartered group of persons
organized to assist the program manager in achieving the
system safety objectives.
Syst em s afet y ma nage ment. An element of management that
establishes the system safety program requirements and
ensures the planning, implementation and accomplishment of
tasks and activities to achieve system safety consistent
with the overall program requirements.
System safety program . The combined tasks and activities of
system safety management and system safety engineering that
enhance operational effectiveness by satisfying the system
safety requirements in a timely, cost-effective manner
throughout all phases of the system life cycle.
System safety program plan ( SSPP) . A formal document that
fully describes the planned safety tasks required to meet
the system safety requirements, including organizational
responsibilities, methods of accomplishment, milestones,
depth of effort, and integration with other program
engineering and management activities and related systems.
Historical safety data generated by other systems are
considered and used, where appropriate.
Minimum risk is involved in accepting and using of new
designs, materials, and production and testing
techniques
.
Retrofit actions required to improve safety are
minimized through the timely inclusion of safety
features during development and acquisition of a
system.
Modifications do not degrade the inherent safety of
the system.
Consideration is given to safety and ease of disposal
and demilitarization of any hazardous materials
associated with the system. [Ref. 10: p. 3]
The SSPR identifies milestones each with specific safety
tasks to be performed at associated phases in the system
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lifecycle. These phase tasks are very similar in content
and purpose, though more definitive, to those phase tasks
previously covered. For example, during the program
initiation phase, the following is a list of the required
system safety tasks:
Evaluate all material, design features, procedures and
operational concepts and environments under
consideration which will affect safety throughout the
lifecycle.
Perform a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) to
identify hazards associated with each alternative
concept.
Identify possible safety interface problems.
Highlight special areas of safety consideration, such
as system limitations, risks, and man-rating
requirements
.
Review safe and successful designs of similar systems
for consideration in alternative concepts.
Define the system safety requirements based on past
experience with similar systems.
Identify safety requirements that may require waiver
during the system lifecycle.
Identify any safety design analysis, test,
demonstration and validation requirements.
Document the system safety analyses, results, and
recommendations for each promising alternative system
concept.
Prepare a summary report of the results of the system
safety tasks conducted during the program initiation
phase to support the decision-making process.
Tailor the system safety program for the subsequent
phases of the lifecycle and include detailed
requirements in the appropriate demonstration and




Similarly detailed tasks descriptions re prescribed for
the engineering development phase, the production and
deployment phase and the modification and disposal phase.
It is the responsibility of the managing activity to:
Establish, plan, organize, and implement an effective
system safety program that is integrated into all
lifecycle phases.
Establish definitive system safety program
requirements for the procurement or development of a
system. The requirements to be set forth clearly in
the appropriate system specifications and contractual
documents and define:
In the appropriate system specifications, the
system safety performance and design requirements
that are available and applicable.
In the statement of work, the system safety
requirements that can't be defined in the system
specifications. This would include general design
guidelines
.
In the statement of work and contract or data
requirements list as applicable, the specified
safety data; e.g., analyses, tests or progress
reports that will be required during the scope of
the effort.
Ensure that an SSPP is prepared that reflects in
detail how the total program is to be conducted.
Review and approve for implementation the SSPP's
prepared by the contractor.
Supply historical safety data as available.
Monitor contractor's system safety activities and
review and approve deliverable data to ensure adequate
performance and compliance with system safety
requirements
.
Ensure that the appropriate system specifications are





Evaluate new design criteria for inclusion into
military specifications and standards and submit
recommendations to the respective responsible
organization.
The system safety program outlined in the SSPR requires
that a safety organization be established for the conduct
and management of the system safety program for both the
managing activity and contractor. The responsibilities and
functions for those directly associated with system safety
policies and implementation of the program must be clearly
defined. The authority delegated to this organization and
the relationship between line, staff, and interdepartmental,
project, functional, and general management organization
shall be identified. Personnel assigned to the system
safety program shall be identified including their
qualifications, specific experience, and formal education or
training. [Ref. 10: p. 9]
The SSPR Standard details the means by which hazards can
be controlled, e.g., safety devices, warning devices,
establishment of procedures and training in addition to
describing various analytical techniques to be used
throughout the various phases; e.g., risk assessment,
establishing environmental constraints, etc. Examples of
such analytic tools presented include:
Faul t ha zard ana ly si s -- an inductive method of
analysis which can be used exclusively as a
qualitative analysis, or, if desired, expanded to a
quantitative one. The fault hazard analysis requires
a detailed investigation of the subsystems to
determine component hazard modes, causes of those
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hazards, and resultant effects to the subsystem and its
operation.
Faul t tree a na ly si s -- a deductive analytical tool
used to analyze all events, faults, and occurrences
and all their combinations that could cause or
contribute to the occurrence of a defined undesired
event. A qualitative or quantitative analysis may be
conducted.
Snea k Ci rcui t Analys is -- conducted on hardware and
software to identify latent (sneak) circuits and
conditions that inhibit desired functions or cause
undesired functions to occur, without a component
having failed. The analysis employs recognition of
topological patterns which are characteristic of all
circuits and electrical/ electronic systems. [Ref.
10: pp. 13-14]
The SSPR standard is consistant with current system
safety concepts and serves as a comprehensive guide for.
project managers in assuring that safety is given maximum
consideration throughout the life cycle of a product or
system and hence that the product or system is as safe as
practicable for the users.
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IV. LIGHTER THAN AIR SAFETY
One of the functions of a system safety organization is
to review histories when available, of hazards, failures and
mishaps in existing systems to ensure that design
deficiencies are not repeated in new systems, designs or
products. Conveniently, for the Coast Guard, such a history
of LTA safety records has been compiled and maintained by
the U.S. Navy Safety Center covering the Navy's extensive
operating experience with LTA's. An examination of this
statistical record provides some insight into the general
nature of the safety hazards and risks experienced by the
Navy and therefore offers some potential benefit for the
Coast Guard LTA project managers. This chapter examines the
Navy's records.
Another function of a system safety organization is to
participate in preparations and reviews to ensure that
incompatible or unsafe subsystems are not incorporated into
otherwise acceptable systems. In a sense, a Coast Guard LTA
system, a fleet of LTA's could be considered a subsystem.
Considering all comparable vehicles currently comprising the
Coast Guard's inventory— ships, helicopters, and fixed wing
aircraft -- the LTA project can be viewed as a potential
addition to an existing system--a system comprised of
'operational platforms'. Taken as a whole, the inventory of
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existing operational platforms has associated with it some
overall degree of safety. The inclusion of a new platform
,
such as a fleet of LTA's would potentially lower, raise or
result in no change to this overall degree of safety,
depending of course on the safety risks associated with
LTA's. A comparative analysis of the hazards, failures and
mishaps associated with LTA's, from the Navy's records, and
recent records for currently operational Coast Guard
platforms, may provide some clue as to what impact the
acquisition of an LTA fleet may have on the current overall
degree of safety experienced by the Coast Guard. Therefore
this chapter examines not only the Navy LTA records but also
records of aviation platforms operational currently in the
Coast Guard.
A. NAVY AIRSHIP ACCIDENT HISTORY
The historical airship data obtained from the Navy Safety









During the 15 year period from 1946 through 1961, the
record shows a total of 207 accidents, approximately 14
accidents per year. The leading cause of these accidents
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was attributed to pilot error. Of the causes listed for
these accidents, pilot error accounted for 39 percent.
Accidents caused by personnel handling and ground facilities
accounted for 23 percent while weather accounted for 21
percent and equipment failure accounted for 17 percent.
The accidents occurred during one of three phases of
operations: flight, landing/ takeof f , or 'not incidental to
flight' (on the ground). By far the most frequent phase
accidents occurred during was that of landing/takeoff. 50
percent of the accidents occurred during landing or takeoff,
18 percent during flight and 32 percent were classified as
occurring 'not incidental to flight'.
Approximately 46 percent of the 207 accidents reported
were categorized, according to degree of damage, as major
accidents (destroyed or substantial damage) with the
remaining 54 percent categorized as less than major (limited
or minor damage). Of the major accidents, 70 percent were
flight related ( landing/ takeof f or inflight) and of the non-
major accidents, 80 percent were flight related. Collision
with the ground, water, or other unintended obstacle was the
major cause of airship damage figuring into 69 percent of
all accidents reported. In only 2 percent of all accidents
were fatalities recorded. In 6 percent of the accidents
survivors sustained major injury while minor injuries
resulted from 9 percent of the accidents. [Ref. 11]
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Piecing together these statistics, the most common
scenario for an airship accident involved a pilot
unintentionally causing collision, during landing or
takeoff, resulting in minor damage to the airship and its
occupants
.
B. COAST GUARD AVIATION ACCIDENTS
This section examines the actual experience of the Coast
Guard with aviation mishaps in recent years. The data
examined covers a two year period: FY 1982 and FY 1983. The
aircraft involved in these mishaps are representative of all
the types of aircraft in the Coast Guard inventory during
the period:
C130, four engine, fixed wing
HU16, twin engine, fixed wing
HU25, twin engine, fixed wing
H3, twin engine helicopter
H52, single engine helicopter
C1 31 , twin engine, fixed wing
The Coast Guard categorizes aviation mishaps by extent
of damage and personnel injury. There are four such
classifications, defined as follows [Ref. 12]:
Mi shap Clas s A: Total cost of property damage,
injury, and occupational illness is $500,000.00 or
more, or, the aircraft is missing, abandoned,
destroyed, or unecono mical ly repair able , or , a
fatality is involved.
Mi shap Clas s B: Total cost of property damage,
injury, and occupational illness is at least
$100,000.00 but less than $500,000.00.
Mi shap C lass C: Total cost of property damage is at
least $10,000.00 but less than $100,000.00, or, injury
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or occupational illness result in a lost workday case
involving days away from work.
Mi snap Clas s D: Total cost of property damage is
greater than $1,000.00, or, an injury or occupational
illness results in a lost workday case involving days
of restricted work activity or a non-fatal case
without lost work days, or, a significant potential
for a near-mid-air collision existed.
The mishaps are also categorized as follows:
By operational mode, either in flight or on the ground
By primary cause factor:
Environment




By type of mission on which mishap occurred
Of the 707 mishaps recorded during the period 1.5
percent were Class A, 1.4 percent Class B, 23 percent Class
C, and 74 percent Class D. Almost 92 percent of all mishaps
occurred in flight with only 8 percent occurring on the
ground. By cause factor, 15 percent were attributed to
environment, .4 percent to near-mid-air, 4 percent to FOD,
65 percent to mechanical failure, and only 16 percent were
attributed to personnel. Counting Class A and Class B
mishaps as 'major' and Class C and Class D as 'minor'
mishaps, 2.9 percent of the mishaps were major and the
remaining 97.1 percent were minor. Less than one percent of
the mishaps resulted in fatality.
Given the data, the most likely scenario for an aviation
mishap in the Coast Guard would involve an inflight
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mechanical failure resulting in minor damage to the aircraft
and its occupants.
C. COMPARISONS
Table IV-1 shows the various percentages tabulated from
both the Navy's LTA mishap records and the recent Coast
Guard aircraft mishap records. Some significant contrasts
are apparent from this comparison.
The most striking difference in the 'causes' information
is that the predominant cause cited in Navy LTA mishaps was
'Pilot Error 1 , while the predominant cause for Coast Guard
aviation mishaps is 'Equipment Malfunction'. Further,
'Equipment Malfunction' was the l ea st cited cause of LTA
mishap while it was the mos t common cause cited for the
Coast Guard aircraft. Some caution is prudent in
considering the significance of these differences. These
cause determinations were made by different people, working
for different services, at different times and on different
types of aircraft. Discounting these differences, for the
moment, some hypotheses seem plausible and supportable by
the contrasts in the data. For instance, the percent of
mishaps attributed to equipment or mechanical malfunction
going f roml 7 percent for the LTA to 65% for the Coast Guard
aircraft, may be explained by the relative degree of
simplicity associated with the old LTA craft contrasted with
the more technologically sophisticated aircraft of today's
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Table IV-1 . Mishap Characteristics by Percentage





A. Pilot Error 39% 16%
B. Ground Handling/Facility 23% 4%
C. Weather 21% 15%
D. Equipment Failure 17% 65%
Total 100% 100%
2. Phase of Flight Mishap Occurred During
A. Landing or Takeoff 50% 92%
B. In Flight 18% *
C. Not Incident To Flight (on ground) 32% 8%
Total 100% 100%
3. Extent of Damage as a Result of Mishaps
A. Major Damage 46% 2.9%
B. Minor Damage 54% 97.1%
Total 100% 100%
4. Mishaps Involving Collision
A. Collision Involved 69% 35%
B. Collision Not Involved 31% 65%
Total 100% 100%
5. Severity of Injury Resulting from Mishap
A. Resulted in Fatality 2% 1%
B. Resulted in Serious Injury 6% 3%
C. Resulted in Minor Injury 9% 23%
D. Resulted in No Injury 83% 73%
Total 100% 100%
* Distinction between in flight and landing/takeoff phase
not recorded in data.
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Coast Guard. The difference in percent of mishaps
attributable to pilot error, 39 percent for LTA and only 16
percent for modern aircraft is a little less convincingly
explainable. One might expect that the faster and more
complex modern aircraft might be more demanding on the pilot
than the slow and relatively simple LTA's of the Navy, but
that is not borne out by this finding. Perhaps the evidence
is explained by the difference in degree of controllability.
The LTA's, while slower than modern aircraft, were large and
less responsive to pilot control input than are modern
aircraft. The LTA, with its vastly greater surface area and
relatively smaller power plants, were more affected by wind
and weather than modern aircraft. The greater difficulty
involved in controlling an LTA may well explain the greater
incidence of mishaps attributed to LTA pilots. This same
control difficulty may explain the significant difference in
the percent of mishaps attributable to ground handling, 23
percent for LTA and only 4 percent for Coast Guard aircraft,
as well as the smaller difference noted in weather
attributed causes.
The breakdown of mishaps by phase of flight also shows
some contrast. Where the LTA experienced 38 percent of
mishaps during the ground phase--'Not Incidental to Flight',
the modern aircraft experienced only 8 percent of mishaps in
this phase. The explanation that the LTA's were more
difficult to control in wind and weather, even while on the
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ground, they are difficult to secure against movement by
wind, may account for the different statistics.
The difference in category of damage--maj or vs. minor,
is very striking. While 46 percent of reported mishaps for
the Navy LTA's were classified as major, less than 3 percent
of the Coast Guard aircraft mishaps were so classified. In
both the Navy and Coast Guard records most of the mishaps
reported were classified as minor. While not denying the
strong possibility that the difference in percentage of
major mishaps is significant, consideration of the different
reporting procedures used should be considered. There is
basis for contending that mishaps reporting procedures in
recent years are more comprehensive than those of earlier
years. As evidence of this, it was not until the mid 1950's
that the Navy records tracked mishaps classified as 'Not
incident to Flight'.
It may well be that mishaps of a minor nature, such as
the Class D mishaps in the Coast Guard data, did not
require reports during the earlier years when the Navy
records were collected. Class D Coast Guard mishaps did
account for 74 percent of all the mishaps recorded and all
of the Class D's fall under the category of 'minor', as used
here. Recent advances in information processing and in
safety program consciousness could explain an increase in
recording of mishaps of a minor nature. Discounting of
reporting procedures aside, it probably is reasonable to
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conclude, however, that the percentage of major vs. minor
mishaps was somewhat greater for LTA's than for the Coast
Guard aircraft.
Another interesting variance noted reveals that, as the
direct cause of damage, collision was responsible in 69
percent of the Navy mishaps and only 35 percent of the Coast
Guard mishaps. Again, this difference may well be explained
by the greater controllability problem of LTA's discussed
earlier.
The injury statistics reveal that fatalities and major
injuries, as a percentage of total mishaps, were twice as
high for the Navy LTA's as for the Coast Guard aircraft,
while minor injuries were only half the percentage for LTA's
as for modern aircraft. The fact that the percentages of
fatality and major injury appear to be double for the LTA,
compared to the other aircraft, merits consideration. Much
of this difference, however, may be attributable, once
again, to reporting requirement differences. This
possibility seems supported by the discrepancy between the
two aircraft statistics concerning minor injury. While 9
percent of the Navy mishaps resulted in minor injury, 23
percent of the Coast Guard mishaps resulted in minor injury.
A more thorough accident reporting system would result in
more minor injuries being reported and, with more minor
injuries being reported, the relative percentage of major
injuries would appear to decrease.
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Based on the data in Table IV-1, it appears, compared to
modern aircraft, that LTA's experienced more mishaps due to
pilot error, that mishaps occurred more often during ground
operations 'not incidental to flight', that damage was more
severe, that major injury and fatality was more likely to be
involved in a typical mishap, and that collision was more




Regrettably, actual statistics on the number of Navy
LTA's and number of flight hours was not available and hence
possibly significant comparisons between actual accident
rates are not possible within the scope of the paper. There
are, however some conclusions to be drawn from the data that
is available. As observed earlier, the Navy's experience
would lead one to expect that operation of similar LTA's
would result in mishaps similar in character to those
experienced by the Navy. In summary, as opposed to Coast
Guard Aircraft, LTA operations appear to result in mishaps
characterized more often by: pilot error, collision, ground
handling difficulties, major injuries and fatalities--as a
proportion of total mishaps. Each of these characteristics
suggest significant ramifications of concern to the Coast
Guard as consideration of LTA acquisition continues.
An increase in pilot-error related mishaps would be
undesireable from everyone's point of view, particularly the
pilots involved. In today's competitive Coast Guard, pilot-
error mishaps are, more than ever, considered anathema by
career minded pilots.
The greater percentage of collision related mishaps also
poses some problems. Material and labor are more expensive
commodities today than in the past and our airfields and
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communities around them are more congested and developed
than ever before. The possible consequences being more
collisions with buildings than, as in the past, with trees,
more expensive repairs, more la wsuit s- -particu larly when
pilot-error is involved.
The relatively greater percentage of serious injury and
fatality associated with an LTA mishap can not be considered
an attractive feature by anyone.
Of course the significance of the characteristic mishap
profile presented by the LTA data can not be ascertained
without data on the frequency of mishaps occurring. Clearly
if mishaps occur more frequently in LTA operations than in
modern aircraft operations, then a major problem exists.
If, however, mishaps can be determined to occur less
frequently among LTA's than aircraft currently in use, then
favorable consideration may be merited.
What is clear from study of the data available, is that
improved maneuverability and controllability should be a
priority objective for development of a new LTA vehicle.
Solution of this -problem would alter favorably the pilot-
error, collision, serious injury, ground incident character
of the typical LTA mishap. This conclusion is not new
however. . The Coast Guard project planners have in fact
placed high priority on improving controllability of the LTA




MISSIONS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE MPA VEHICLE
Design Missions
Tables I through XXV identify typical MPA missions and
equipment and will be the basis for the design and
performance of the MPA vehicle system. An examination of
airship application to these roles was conducted in
Reference 1. Typical mission profiles are provided so that
vehicles can be sized and performance analyzed. The design
missions shall include the Coast Guard programs of
Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT), Marine Environmental
Response (MER), Military Operation/ Mi li tary Preparedness
(MO/MP), Marine Science Activities (MSA), Port and
Environmental Safety (PES), Search and Rescue (SAR), Short
Range Aids to Navigation (NRS) and Ice Operations (10). The
fixed payload for all the above mission profiles is
presented in Table I. Note the sensors and avionics shown
in these tables are specific items which will be used on the
two newest Coast Guard Aircraft, the HU-25 Medium Range
Surveillance (MRS) jet and the HH-65A Short Range Recovery
(SRR) helicopter. The inclusion of these specific items is
intended to illustrate the functional capabilities which are
required for the MPA, not to indicat e that each of thes e
spec if ic comp onents is requ ir ed . The contractor shall
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consider the unique characteristics of the airship and the
mission requirements in optimizing sensor and avionic
equipment required.
Speeds specified for all profiles (Tables II through
XXV) are g roun d speeds . In addition, a cons tant headwind
pena It y of five ( 5
)
k nots is to be assumed for vehicle
sizing against the mission profiles. Note, this five knot
headwind is only for the purposes of vehicle and engine
sizing; the wind envelope for controllability purposes shall
be as defined below.
Enforcement of Laws and Treaties ( ELT
)
Under this program, the MPA is intended for drug
enforcement and fisheries enforcement within the confines of
the 200 mile zone surrounding the United States. Note that
long endurance operation, a capacity for "hot pursuit" and
the ability to hover are required.
ELT Search and Board Profile
This representative mission profile shall be used in
sizing the MPA. Specific profile segments are presented in






































18 Ft Inflatable Boat, Motor
and Fuel
20 Man Life Raft
Winch/Hoist, Resupply
Winch, Vessel/Sensor Towing









































Table I. Fixed Equipment and Avionics (cont'd)
24. VOR/DME AN/ARN-123
25. Glide Slope AN/ARN-1 23
26. Marker Beacon AN/ARN-123
27. TACAN AN/ARN-1 18(V
28. Radio Altimeter HG-7502AJ
29. IFF AN/APX-100
30. UHF/VHF DF DF-301E
31 . Remote Magnetic Indicator (RMI) TBD
32. Loudhailer DE-1492A
33. UALB (Pinger) Dukane
NISF-201B




35. Internal Communication System
(ICS)
AUD-22
36. Flight Control System TBD
37. Automatic Flight Control System TBD
(AFCS)
38. Inertial Navigation System LTN-71
(INS) /Omega
39. Navcomputer ( s) TBD
40. Towed Sonar, Provision for TBD
41
.
Cable, for towing vessels/ TBD
sensors
42. FLIR (Forward Looking Infra -Red) TBD
43. Tool and repair kits as required TBD




Table I. Fixed Equipment and Avionics (cont'd
45. Appropriate medical kit
TBD = To be determined.
Seg
Number







Warm-up, Take off @ Sea 0.25
Level TOGW, Standard Day
(T=59°F)
Cruise 250 nm @ 50 kts 5.00
@ 5000 feet
Sweep @ 50 kts for 5.00
5.0 hrs
Dash @ 90 kts for 0.50
0.5 hrs
Hover for 0.50 hrs 0.50
@ 50 feet
Loiter @ 30 kts for 1.00
1.0 hr @ 1000 feet
Hoverfor 0.50 hrs 0.50
@ 50 feet
Sweep § 50 kts for 4.00
4.0 hrs @ 5000 feet
Repeat Steps #5-8 once 6.00










Table II. ELT Search and Board Profile (cont'd)







Note: Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeeds.
All speeds required are groundspeeds
.
























This representative profile shall be used in sizing the
MPA. In-flight reprovisioning is assumed. Profile segments




Table IV. ELT Surveillance Profile
Seg Duration
Number Description (hrs) Remarks
1 Warm-up, Take off @ Sea 0.25 VTO
Level TOGW, Standard
Day (T=59°F)
2 Cruise to station, 105 nm 3.00
@ 50 kts @ 5000 feet for
3.00 hrs
3 Loiter @ 30 kts for 6.0 6.00
hrs @ 5000 feet
4 Dash 45 nm @ 90 kts @ 0.50 Contact Invest-
5000 feet igation
5 Loiter @ 25 kts for 0.50
0.5 hrs @ 2000 feet
6 Cruise back to station 1.00
50 nm @ 50 kts
7 Repeat 4 thru 6, 4 8.00
more times
8 Loiter @ 30 kts for 0.54
for 0.54 hrs @ 5000
feet
9 Dash 30 nm @ 90 kts @ 0.34 Contact Invest-
5000 feet igation
10 Loiter @ 25 kts for 0.50
0.5 hrs 2000 feet
11 Return to station, 0.50
25 nm @ 50 kts
@ 5000 feet
12 Repeat 9 thru 11, 5.32
4 more times









Repeat Steps #3-13 213.66
9 times
Return to base, 200 nm 4.00
@ 50 kts @ 5000 feet
Descend and land 0.35
Total Mission Time 245.00
In-flight re-




Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.




















Marine Environmental Response ( MER)
Under this program, the MPA is intended for use in
surveillance, supply and/or towing of heavy and/or outsized
equipment, and communication, command, and control
(including illumination of the surface) at a specific




This representative mission profile shall be used in
sizing the MPA. specific profile segments are presented in
Table VI and payload data are presented in Table VII.
MER Low-Speed Tow Assessment Profile
In addition to the analysis above, a critical assessment
shall be made of the MPA's ability to tow operating oil
recovery devices at controllable ground speeds of less than
or equal to 1.5 knots. Specific profile segments are
presented in Table VIII and payload data are presented in
Table IX.
MER Cargo Sled Delivery Profile
This representative mission profile is presented in
segment fashion in Table X. Payload data are presented in
Table XI.








Cruise 50 nm @ 50 kts
@ 2000 feet














Table VI. MER Clean-Up Profile (cont'd)
4 Cruise 25 nm @ 50 kts @ 0.50
1000 feet
5 Hover @ 100 foot altitude
for . 5 hrs
6 Cruise 25 nm @ 50 kts @
1000 feet
7 Repeat Steps #3-6 two 4.00
times
8 Loiter @ 30 kts for 3.5
hrs @ 2000 feet
9 Cruise 75 nm @ 50 kts
1 Descend and land







Total Mission Time 12.50
Note: Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds
.
Table VII. MER Clean-Up Payload Data
Item Dimensions Weight
Number Description (LxWxH Ft) (lbs) Remarks
1 Crew of 8 1600 @ 200# per
man
2 Provisions, General 104 @ 25#/man/
Stores and Potable day
Water
3 Chemicals for Spill 500
4 Harbor Oil Boom 440 1 @ 2#/ft










Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea
Level TOGW, Standard Day
(T=59°F)
0.25 VTO
Cruise 50 nm @ 50 kts 1 .00
@ 2000 feet
Hover for 0.5 hrs § 100 0.50 Pick-up
feet Equipment
Cruise 25 nm @ 50 kts at
1000 feet
0.50






Tow Oil Recovery Device




Hover for 0.5 hrs @ 100
feet
Cruise back to base 100 nm







Descend and Land 0.25
11 .50
Note: Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.
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1 Crew of 8 1600 <a 200#/man






















Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea- 0.25
Level. TOGW Standard Day
(T=59°F)
Cruise 50 nm @ 50 kts @ 1.00
2500 feet
Hover @ 200 feet for 0.5 .50
hrs
Tow sled 100 nm @ 40 kts 2.50
Hover @ 200 feet for 0.5 .50
hrs
Loiter @ 30 kts for 6.0 hrs 6.00
@ 5000 feet
Cruise back 150 nm @ 50 kts 3.00
@ 2500 feet





Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.
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Military Operation/Military Preparedness ( MO /MP)
Under this program mission roles will include patrol,
Anti -Submarine Warfare (ASW), ocean industry protection,
convoy escort, logistics and inshore, undersea warfare.
Required abilities include long endurance, hover, "hot
pursuit" and attack.
MO/MP ASW ( Towed Array and Attack) Profile
This representative mission profile shall be used for
MPA sizing purposes. Specific profile segments are




Table XII. MO/MP ASW (Towed Array and Attack) Profile
Seg Duration Remarks
Number Description (hrs)
1 Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea Level 0.25 VTO
TOGW, Standard Day (T=59°F)
2 Cruise 300 nm @ 40 kts @ 7.50
5000 feet
3 Tow array @ 10 kts for 0.50 0.50 Tow drag=
hrs @ 500 feet 2300#
4 Cruise 15 nm @ 30 kts @ 1000 0.50
feet
5 Repeat Steps #3-4 fourteen 14.00
times
6 Dash 90 nm @ 40 kts @ 500 1.00
feet
7 Localize target @ 40 kts @ 0.34
500 feet
8 Attack @ 40 kts @ 500 feet 0.16 Deploy (2)
torpedoes
9 Cruise 1 00 nm @ 40 kts @ 2.50
2500 feet




Total Mission Time 27.00
Note: Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.
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MO/MP ASW ( Mine Countermeasures ) Profile
This representative profile shall be used for MPA sizing
purposes. The ability of MPA to perform this mission shall
be discussed. Profile segments are presented in table XIV
and payload data are presented in Table XV.
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Table XIV. MO/MP ASW (Mine Countermeasures ) Profile
Seg Duration
Number Description ( hrs ) Remarks
Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea 0.25 VTO
Level TOGW, Standard Day
(T=59°F)
Cruise 25 nm @ 50 kt at 0.50
2000 feet
Hover
4 Tow MCM gear @ 30 kt at
200 feet for 3.0 hrs
5 Hover
6 Repeat Steps #2-4 two
times
7 Cruise back to base, 50 nm 1.00
@ 50 kt at 2000 feet









Total Mission Time 13.50
Note: Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed
All speeds required are groundspeeds.
Table XV. MO/MP ASW (Mine Countermeasures) Payload Data
Item Dimensions Weight
Number Description (LxWxH Ft) (lbs) Remarks









Table XV. MO/MP ASW (Mine Countermeasures ) cont'd
3 Marker, BT , AN 300
4 Sweeping Gear 9000 MK-105
type
1 1 ,004
Marine Science Activities (MSA)
Under this program airships are projected for use in
International Ice Patrol (IIP), Airborne Radiation
Thermometry (ART), and NOAA data buoy support. Necessary
vehicle attributes include long endurance, low visibility
operation, low vibration, safe low altitude operation and
hover.
MSA Ice Patrol (St. Johns) Profile
This representative mission profile shall be used in
sizing the MPA system. Specific mission profile segments
are presented in Table XVI and payload data are presented in
Table XVII.
Table XVI. MSA Ice Patrol (St. John's) Profile
Seg Duration
Number Description (hrs) Remarks
Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea 0.25 VTO
Level TOGW, (t=30°F)




Table XVI. MSA Ice Patrol (St. John's) Profile cont'd.
3
Note
Cruise at 60 kts for 30
hrs at 1000 feet











Add constant 5 kt headwind. to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.




















Port and Environmental Safety (PES
)
Under this program the MPA is intended for escort of
vessels transporting hazardous cargoes, port traffic
control, and delivery of fire fighting equipment.
PES Hazardous Vessel Escort Profile
This representative mission profile shall be used in
sizing the MPA system. Specific mission profile segments
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are presented in Table XVIII and payload data are presented
in Table XIV.





Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea
Level TOGW, Standard Day
(T=59°F)
0.25 VTO
2 Cruise 50 nm @ 40 kts at 1 .25
5000 feet
3 Loiter at 30 kts for 6.0
hrs
6.00
4 Cruise 25 nm @ 40 kts .60




Total Mission Time .35
Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.




(LxWxH Ft) (lbs) Remarks














5 Smoke and Light Floats 42 6 of each
In addition to quantities already in fixed payload (Table
I).
Search and Rescue ( SAR)
Under this program the MPA will be operated in missions
involving long range rescue of personnel and/or disabled
vehicles. Required abilities include long endurance, high
speed, large payload capacity, hover and vessel tow
capacity.
SAR Search, Board and Tow Profile
This representative mission profile shall be used in
sizing the MPA system. Specific mission profile segments
are presented in Table XX and payload data are presented in
Table XXI.
Table XX. SAR Search, Board and Tow Profile
Seg Duration
Number Description (hrs) Remarks
1 Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea 0.25
Level TOGW, Standard Day
(T=59°F)
2 Cruise 25 nm @ 90 kts at 0.38
5000 feet
3 Search for 1.5 hrs @ 60 kts 1.50






XX. SAR Search, Board and Tow Profile cont'd.
able boat
Loiter @ 30 kts for 2.0
hrs @ 1000 feet




Tow 250 ton displacement



















Note: Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed
All speeds required are groundspeeds.


















Short Range Aids to Navigation (NSR)
Under this program the MPA is projected for roles which
include buoy discrepancy reporting, buoy placement and
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logistics. Required abilities of the vehicle include long
endurance, precision navigation, and large (bulky) cargo
capacity.
Short Range NSR Buoy Maintenance Profile
This representative profile shall be used in sizing the
MPA system. Specific mission profile segments are presented
in Table XXII and payload data are presented in Table XXIII.
Table XXII. NSR Buoy Maintenance Profile
Seg Duration
Number Description (hrs) Remarks
Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea 0.25
Level TOGW, Standard Dav
(T=59°F)
Cruise 150 nm @ 50 kt at 3.00
1000 feet
Hover @ 100 feet for 0.5 0.50
hrs
Cruise 80 nm @ 50 kt at 1.60
500 feet
Repeat Steps #3-4 four 8.40
times
Cruise 150 nm @ 50 kt 3.00
at 1000 feet
Descend and land 0.25 10 percent
fuel re-
maining
Total Mission Time 17.00
Note: Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.
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(LxWxH Ft) ( lbs) Remarks












Ice Operations ( 10)
Under this program the airship is intended for the
mission of Aerial Ice Reconnaissance (AIR). The platform
will require the ability to perform long range operations,
to carry large sensors (such as Side Looking Airborne Radar-
SLAR) with associated processing equipment and to operate in
poor visibility, low altitude and icing conditions.
10 Ice Mapping Profile
This representative mission profile shall be used in
sizing the MPA. The specific mission profile segments are
























Warm-up, Take-off @ Sea
Level TOGW, (T=30°F)
Cruise @ 60 kts for 13 hrs
@ 5000 feet
Map @ 60 kts for 13 hrs @
5000 feet
Hover @ Sea Level 1 hour
to refuel @ 100 feet
Same as segment 3
Same as segment 2
Descend and Land
Total Mission Time 53.50
Note Add constant 5 kt headwind to compute airspeed.
All speeds required are groundspeeds.




(LxWxH Ft) (lbs) Remarks
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